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Abstract  -  As  adhoc  networks  are  becoming  increasingly 
important  for  variety  of  applications,  so  are  the  rules  and 
specifications  for  their  formations  and  operations.  In  this 
paper, we describe how roles of participating devices can be 
framed to facilitate access and formation of an adhoc network. 
Further, we propose XML framework for secured file transfer 
in a typical case where adhoc network nodes exchange files and 
data  among  themselves.  We  also  show  corresponding  XML 
pseudo-code in the light of world-wide-web consortium (W3C) 
guidelines. 
     
I. INTRODUCTION 
A mobile adhoc network (MANET) [1-3] provides 
a  communication  environment  that  is  characterized  by 
dynamic changes in the topology and in the availability of 
resources. More research work has, recently, been reported 
in  literature,  which  addresses  issues  of  security  across 
different  aspects  of  adhoc  networks.  For  example,  the 
authors in [4-6] address the weaknesses of current routing 
protocols  in  adhoc  networks  with  respect  to  security  and 
highlight  the  robustness  of  the  mechanisms  proposed  in 
their work. In [7], the authors have addressed security issues 
in  an  environment  where  devices  remain  in  contact  with 
each  other  for  longer  duration.  For  this  purpose,  a  fully 
distributed approach has been proposed to secure long term 
communities of devices. Buchegger and Le Boudec [8] have 
proposed a technique called CONFIDANT (Cooperation of 
Nodes,  Fairness  In  Demand  Adhoc  NeTworks)  that 
primarily  aims  at  detecting  malicious  nodes  by  means  of 
combined monitoring and reporting and establishing routes 
by  avoiding  misbehaving  nodes.    The  weakness  lies  in 
detection  process  where  node  identity  is  assumed  to  be 
persistent. This may lead to spoofing attacks. A related work 
can also be found in [9], where authors have addressed a 
subset of all threats in adhoc networks and have proposed 
short of a comprehensive answer to the security problem. 
Typically,  collaborations  among  the  participants 
that form an adhoc network cannot be set up because they 
do not trust each other to use their respective services and 
resources  [10-11].  Therefore,  there  is  a  need  for  explicit 
specification of policies for each activity. A large number of 
enterprises have recently started to explore Internet based 
workflow  management  systems  to  help  improve  their 
services  and  decision-making  processes  [12].  There  has 
been  a  number  of  access  control  models  discussed  in 
literature
 for various objectives [13-14]. Among them, the 
RBAC model is gaining attention as a generalized approach 
and  provides  several  advantages.  Under  the  RBAC 
framework, users are granted membership into roles based 
on  their  responsibilities  in  the  organization.  User 
membership  into  roles  can  be  revoked  easily  and  new 
memberships established as job assignments dictate. Role-
Based Access Control (RBAC) models [15-16] are receiving 
increasing  attention  as  a  generalized  approach  to  access 
control.  Thus,  a  role  is  a  collection  of  permissions  (or 
operations on a set of objects) determined by the system, 
based  on  the  users  organizational  activities  and 
responsibilities. Furthermore, RBAC has shown to be policy 
neutral  [17]  and  supports  security  policy  objectives,  and 
static  and  dynamic  separation  of  duty  constraints  [16]. 
Moreover, RBAC offers flexibility with respect to different 
security policies and in fact [18] shows that RBAC can be 
configured to enforce  mandatory and discretionary access 
control policies. 
The  eXtensible  Markup  Language  (XML)  is 
regarded  generally  as  having  promise  of  becoming 
established as the general purpose framework for enabling 
transfer of data amongst heterogeneous environments. It is 
emerging  as  a  useful  platform-independent  data 
representation language and is growing in proportion to the 
spreading speed of e-commerce, which requires a policy for 
providing  a  safer  security  service  for  exchanging  e-
documents within e-commerce. It is of interest therefore to 
analyze how suitable it may be once details of applications 
requirements and constraints are taken into account. Further, 
it becomes necessary to consider the issue of XML access 
control  and  document  security  in  different  network 
environments, for example adhoc network environment.  
A lot of research work has been carried out in the 
area  of  XML,  its  specification  development,  and  security 
features etc. For example in the area of XML, the authors in 
[19]  propose  a  construct  that  locates  related  nodes  in  an 
instance of an XML data model, independent of a specific 
structure. High performance XML parsers can be prepared 
using parser generation and compilation techniques [20]. In 
that, parsing is integrated with Schema-based validation and 
deserialization,  and  the  resulting  validating  parsers  are 
shown to be as fast as or in many cases significantly faster 
than traditional non-validating parsers [20]. 
In  the  area  of  security,  XKMS  (XML  key 
management  specification)  is  one  of  the  XML's  security 
specifications that define the protocol for distributing and 
registering public keys for verifying digital signatures and 
enciphering e-documents of e-commerce applications with 
various  and  complicated  functions.  The  authors  in  [21] 
discuss XKMS-based key management system architecture 
and  a  service  model  using  Java  crypto  technologies  and 
XML  security  mechanisms.  XML  digital  signature 
capability  has  also  been  discussed  in  [22],  where  authors 
describe a solution to add XML digital signature  using a 
signature  server  implemented  as  a  web  service  without 
modifying XML based systems. In [23], the authors explore 
eXtensible  Stylesheet  Language  (XSL),  whose  document 
transformation component (XSLT) may well have sufficient 
functionality  to  perform  all  reasonable  cryptographic 
transformations  to  deliver  a  desired  level  of  document 
security.  The  authors  in  [24]  describe  developments  in semantic  Web  and  then  provide  an  overview  of  secure 
semantic Web. In particular XML security, RDF security, 
and secure information integration and trust on the semantic 
Web are addressed. Another work on Web and e-commerce 
applications  security  has  been  reported  in  [25],  where 
authors  discuss,  in  particular,  access  control  policies, 
workflow  security,  XML  security  and  federated  database 
security  issues  pertaining  to  the  Web  and  e-commerce 
applications.  In  emerging  applications,  a  similar  work  is 
found  in  [26],  where  future  directions  for  data  and 
applications  security  that  include  secure  semantic  Web, 
XML security and applications such as bioinformatics, peer-
to-peer computing, and stream information management are 
addressed.  In  [27],  the  authors  discuss  concept  of 
cryptographically  secured,  XML  based  Security  Labels 
using a guard prototype for file transfer and web services 
based  applications.￿ Another  approach  related  to  XML 
access  control  is  reported  in  [28],  where  storage  of  the 
accessibility  information  is  based  on  the  compressed 
accessibility  map  (CAM),  and  further  improved  by 
integrating  multiple  CAMs  into  an  integrated  CAM 
(ICAM). 
 
II. PROPOSED APPROACH 
The  formation  of  an  adhoc  network  requires  that 
authentication  and  server  devices  be  present  to  initiate 
formation of an adhoc network. The joining of a device is to 
be  authenticated  by  a  server  owned  by  the  organization. 
Such network architecture is depicted in Figure 1. It consists 
of a group of devices forming an adhoc network through an 
authentication  server.  We  propose  a  multi-channel  model 
for accessing services and information interchange among 
users. The objective is to define and categorize types of data 
transfer  pertaining  to  general  and  role  specific  use 
respectively  for  sake  of  easiness  and  simplicity.  The 
universal  description,  discovery,  and  integration  (UDDI) 
channel is proposed to include registry information about 
the groups, given by the central server and propagated by 
the coordinator device. Each entry in the UDDI channel is 
identified  by  Keyi,  and  information  within  the  channel  is 
customized  to  fit  wireless  environments.  The  session 
channel  contains  the  description  of  each  session,  and 
information  within  the  session  channel  is  indexed  with  a 
service key to enable better access performance. The data 
channel  is  used  to  transfer  data  among  network  devices. 
Whenever a device enters an adhoc network, it downloads 
UDDI channels content to its device and store it for later 
use. Caching it avoids frequent access to the channel, and 
minimizes power consumption of the devices as well. Thus, 
the organizations need to empower mobile user devices with 
the ability to: 
·  Discover session and data channel(s)  
·  Find out the way to invoke the session (like which 
input parameters are required). 
The impact of using a data buffer, as shown in Figure 1, 
is to improve cache retrieval. The objective of coordinator 
buffer is to share and cache those data frequently used by all 
mobile users. This reduces the amount of disk accesses in 
central databases. At the end of transaction execution, the 
device  has  to  perform  buffer  write  to  store  updated data. 
This  in  turn  invalidates  obsolete  data  in  the  buffer.  The 
authentication server may be empowered to supervise many 
adhoc network(s). In case, if authentication device leaves 
and another takes over, a new broadcast from authentication 
server is to be initiated to let all devices know that there is a 
new  authentication  server.  This  however,  will  require  all 
devices to re-authenticate.  
Roles  essentially  partition  database  information  into 
access contexts. Methods associated with a database object, 
also  partition  the  object  interface  to  provide  windowed 
access to object information. By specifying that all database 
information  is  held  in  database  objects  and  authorizing 
methods  to  roles,  we  achieve  object  interface  distribution 
across roles. By authorizing different users to the different 
roles,  we  can  enforce  both  the  order of  execution  on  the 
objects  and  separation  of  duty  constraints  on  method 
execution. Because of space limitations in mobile devices 
(like laptops etc.), data is proposed to be at database server, 
where  single  or  distributed  databases  can  be  placed,  and 
then caching of events, registries and other services can be 
allowed on individual devices. 
Figure 1: Adhoc Network Infrastructure with multi channels
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A. Access Security 
The policy based design of adhoc groups is the idea 
that groups are defined around objects and that objects can 
be hierarchically combined. Objects might include people, 
teams, locations, tasks, projects, or meetings, data (such as 
files  or  database  tables),  and  resources  (such  as  printers, 
scanners, or displays). All objects are uniquely identified by 
resource  identifiers  akin  to  uniform  resource  indicators 
(URIs) and will need to be maintained on a server and on 
individual devices as needed to provide redundancy when 
connectivity is unavailable. Based on these guidelines, the 
architecture  for  access  control  in  adhoc  networks  is 
proposed  of  four  components  as  shown  in  Figure  2.  The 
components  are:  profile  management  and  membership 
management  (combined  as  user  management),  protocol 
management, policy enforcement and an event service. The 
framework  runs  on  every  user’s  device.  The  profile 
management  component  maintains  the  user’s  credentials, 
such  as  key  certificates  and  stores,  and  attributes 
certificates. Users can manage their credentials and device settings through user management interface. In addition, this 
component also maintains the user’s preferences on which 
communities  the  device  should  automatically  join.  The 
membership  management  component  exposes  the  user 
management  interface  to  the  application  level,  so  that 
applications  can  initiate  the  establishment  of  a  new 
community,  search  for  communities,  as  well  as  joining 
particular communities. Through this interface, the user can 
register the services that it is providing to other participants. 
The  membership  management  component  is  also 
responsible  for  checking  the  authenticity  of  the  doctrines 
and enforcing them by extracting and distributing the policy 
instances  to  various  enforcement  components.  Lastly,  the 
event  service  collects  and  aggregates  events  and 
subsequently forwards them to the policy enforcement, e.g. 
the  triggering  of  the  execution  of  obligation  policies. 
System events are forwarded to the protocol management, 
so  that  appropriate  protocols  can  be  performed.  Events 
regarding the discovery of new communities are forwarded 
to the membership management component. 
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Figure 2: The Acess Control Framework for Roles
  
B. Access algorithm for devices 
Below,  we  present  an  algorithm  with  the  main 
steps  that  need  to  be  performed  to  execute  the  network 
access service. Adhoc users generally start by looking for 
service  on  their  category  and  role.  They  may  look  for 
services  initiated  by  their  parent  organization  and  are 
specific to their roles. The tuning and access to a channel is 
to be performed by an appropriate access method.  
Algorithm execute-service:  
/*executed whenever device sniffs an adhoc network*/  
Begin:  
a.  Find adhoc service having a given category in the 
local UDDI directory 
b.  Select a service and retrieve its service  key  Keyi 
and  compare  with  the  key  stored  in  the  event 
service. 
c.  Retrieve the frequency of the service channel  
d.  Listen to the service channel  
e.  Download  the  description  of  the  service  having 
Keyi as the service key. 
f.  Based  on  the  service  key  Keyi,  determine  input 
parameters  (from  user  management)  to  initiate 
access to the network. 
g.  Proceed to login to the network.  
h.  After successful login, retrieve the frequency of the 
data channel  
i.  Download  role  specification  for  the  device  and 
store it in event service  
j.  Execute  the  service  or  exchange  data  with  other 
users on the data channel of the network.  
End 
 
C. XML Framework 
There  are  various  traditional  techniques  that  use 
wrapping  over  an  XML  document  to  provide  document 
security; however none of them can be embedded within the 
document.  An  essential  requirement  of  proposed  XML 
security  framework  is  that  it  should  work  naturally  with 
content created using XML.  The objective is to guarantee 
the aspects of integrity, confidentiality, and accountability 
(key management). This is achieved by fitting together the 
ideas of the XML encryption and XML digital signature in 
the light of the specifications provided by world wide web 
consortium  (W3C)  [29].  We  define  the  framework  as 
formation  of  components.  These  components  are 
independent and provide atomic operations that are needed 
while implementing a secure XML based application. The 
components  should  be  designed  with  respect  to  the  level 
they  are  categorized  into,  such  as  level  1  and  level  2 
components. 
 
Figure 3: XML Encryption and Signing Components 
 
At the first layer are level 1 components consisting 
of all the basic level functionality that is required by any 
security  system.  The  level  1  components  will  give  an 
interface  to  the  next  level  components  to  use  the 
traditionally available methods for security and also provide 
XML parsing capabilities to the higher level components, 
such as parsers, request/response management components 
and  inter-communication  components.  The  level  2 
components  are  XML  transformation  components,  key 
management  components,  encryption/decryption 
components,  signature/validation  components  and  access 
control  components,  forming  the  core  of  the  framework. 
These  components  provide  the  methods  and  their 
implementations that are defined or outlined in the various 
XML security related specifications provided by the W3C.  
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XML 
Parsing Libraries XML Encryption and Signing Component: In the encryption 
and signing process, there can be a possible need for counter 
signature,  or  partial  encryption.  The  framework  proposes 
that  it  is  better  to  perform  signature  or  encryption  by 
processing  input  XML  along  with  a  stencil/template  that 
specifies a signature or encryption skeleton, the way to use 
transformation component, the usage methods for traditional 
cryptographic/algorithm  components,  and  the  way  to 
interface  with  XML  key  management  component  for  key 
selection process. This stencil document will be an XML 
document itself with similar structure as the desired result 
but some of the nodes will be left empty and will be filled 
by XML encryption/signature components after performing 
relevant computations. XML Security Framework gets the 
key for signature/encryption from the key manager in the 
key management component using the information from the 
stencil document, does necessary computations and puts the 
results  in  empty  nodes  of  the  given  stencil,  as  shown  in 
Figure 3. Signature or encryption component controls the 
whole process and stores the required temporary data. Since 
the  Stencil  information  is  also  a  XML  file,  it  might  be 
created in advance and saved in a file and can be given to 
the application as an input otherwise the security framework 
Application Program Interface (API) will have to generate a 
stencil by gathering information by itself. This logic allows 
application to create stencils without using XML Security 
Framework functions. Also in some cases stencil should be 
inserted in the signed or encrypted data (for example, if you 
want  to  create  an  enveloped  or  enveloping  signature). 
Signature  verification  and  data  decryption  do  not  require 
template because all the necessary information is provided 
in the signed or encrypted document. 
XML  document  model:  Proposed  XML  document  model, 
enabling role-wise security in an XML document is shown 
in  Figure  4.    XML  Digital  signatures  are  used  to 
lock/encrypt  a  selected  part  of  an  XML  document.  They 
also provide end-to-end message integrity guarantees, and 
can  also  provide  authentication  information  about  the 
originator of a message. An XML signature would define a 
series  of  XML  elements  that  could  be  embedded  in,  or 
otherwise  affiliated  with,  any  XML  document.  It  would 
allow the receiver to verify that the message has not been 
modified from what the sender intended. Format of an XML 
signature is shown in Figure 5.  
Components of Digital Signature: The Id attribute, shown in 
Figure 5 allows a document to contain multiple signatures, 
and provides a way to identify particular instances. Multiple 
signatures  are  used  for  accessing  the  data  with  different 
levels  of  rights.  The  SignedValue  element  contains  the 
actual signature, which is a base64-encoded data, as defined 
by XML DSIG specifications [30]. The ds:object (Figure 5) 
element is used to hold metadata or additional information 
that is considered as a ‘property’ of the digital signature. For 
example, a timestamp for when the signature is generated 
will be considered as a property of the digital signature. 
The contents of ds:SignedInfo can be divided into two parts, 
information  about  the  Signature  value,  and  information 
about the application content, as shown in the code given in 
Figure  6,  defining  attributes  regarding  canonicalization 
(C14N)  method,  signature  method  and  the  reference 
elements used. Reference element contains the digest of the 
content, an indication that, how digest was generated and a 
specification  of  how  the  content  should  be  transformed 
before the digest is generated. 
Figure 4: Key components of XML security enabled document. 
 
<element name="Signature" type="ds:SignatureType"/>
    <complexType name="SignatureType">
      <sequence>
        <element ref="ds:SignedInfo"/>
        <element ref="ds:SignatureValue"/>
        <element ref="ds:KeyInfo" minOccurs="0"/>
        <element ref="ds:Object" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      </sequence>
      <attribute name="Id" type="ID" use="optional"/>
    </complexType>
Figure 5 :Format of a Digital Signature
 
<element name="SignedInfo" type="ds:SignedInfoType"/>
   <complexType name="SignedInfoType">
     <sequence>
       <element ref="ds:CanonicalizationMethod"/>
       <element ref="ds:SignatureMethod"/>
       <element ref="ds:Reference" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
     </sequence>
     <attribute name="Id" type="ID" use="optional"/>
   </complexType>>
Figure 6: SignedInfo component
Marking  Component:  Marking  components  are  used  to 
mark components, requirements, and configurations of the 
required part of the document. The tags used for marking 
components  are  role,  role-hint,  version,  lifecycle-handler 
and instation-strategy of the component to be used. 
Key  Info  Component:  Key  Info  component  is  used  to 
identify  the  signer,  or  at  least  the  key  that  generated  the 
signature. Key Info component also stores the information 
of  the  key  that  is  used  to  protect  the  digest  from  being 
modified. Figure 7 shows a pseudo XML code for Key Info 
element,  providing  a  wide  variety  of  key  types  and  key 
infrastructures.  
 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
We  have  described  role  based  access  and  XML 
based  data  transfer  within  an  adhoc  network.  This  model 
helps  in  providing  security  at  two  levels:  authentication 
based on role, and XML embedded data transfer. As XML model  specification  is  evolving  together  with  commercial 
products for embedding roles within databases, both of these 
independent levels can be merged within one server or an 
application. This way, security within an adhoc network can 
further be simplified. Currently, we are exploring on these 
lines.    
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<element name="KeyInfo" type="ds:KeyInfoType"/>
   <complexType name="KeyInfoType" mixed="true">
     <choice maxOccurs="unbounded">
       <element ref="ds:KeyName"/>
       <element ref="ds:KeyValue"/>
       <element ref="ds:RetrievalMethod"/>
       <element ref="ds:X509Data"/>
       <element ref="ds:PGPData"/>
       <element ref="ds:SPKIData"/>
       <element ref="ds:MgmtData"/>
     </choice>
    <attribute name="Id" type="ID" use="optional"/>
   </complexType>
Figure 7: Key Info Component
 